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Life, they urge, would be intolerable if men were to be guided in all they did by reason and reason 
only. Reason betrays men into the drawing of hard and fast lines, and to the defining by language -- 
language being like the sun, which rears and then scorches. Extremes are alone logical, but they are 
always absurd; the mean is illogical, but an illogical mean is better than the sheer absurdity of an 
extreme.  
Samuel Butler, Erewhon 
 
This quotation from Butler’s topsy-turvy land of Erewhon describes the view of the professors of the 
Colleges of Unreason. His satire of academia is an odd mix of good sense and madness but by the 
way it questions so many of our intellectual habits and assumptions it provides much food for thought. 
The professors of Unreason argue that reason forces us to draw lines and make divisions and that it 
enslaves us to language. This is usually considered a conclusion of rational thought and not at all an 
unreasonable idea. ‘Unreason’ enters with the idea that the ‘illogical’ mean is better than the absurdity 
of the extreme views into which language forces us.  
The professors of Unreason teach their students that in order to endorse a middle way or ‘doctrine of 
the mean’ as the solution for metaphysical dilemmas we must embrace unreason and illogic. This 
seems a reasonable idea to them for it is, after all, their reason that allows them to see the absurdity of 
the extremes in the first place. In this case their endorsement of ‘illogic’ is an outcome of sound 
reasoning. Yet it is questionable whether we should ever abandon the ‘laws of thought’ in this way 
even where logic can find no other way forward. Butler’s professors would answer that we should, but 
real professors generally say we should not on the grounds that metaphysical questions must be 
decidable even if nobody can actually decide one. What is not questionable, for it would be a matter 
of logic and definition, is whether endorsing the middle way would in fact require that we modify or 
abandon Aristotle’s logic and embrace Unreason and Illogic. Butler’s students are taught that the 
mean is ‘illogical’, that this solution breaks or modifies the rules by which we prove it is the best 
solution, and so are most students everywhere. Yet it is not possible to prove it, and the consequence 
of assuming it is an incomprehensible metaphysics.       
A great many philosophers share the view of logic held by the professors of Unreason and perhaps 
almost all those who would call themselves ‘Western’ thinkers. It is endorsed in a recent article for 
Aeon on Buddhist philosophy by Graham Priest under the title ‘Beyond True and False’, in which he 
proposes that while the extremes are logically absurd the mean would require a major modification to 
classical logic. He discusses various complex ideas that would make Buddhist philosophy very 
difficult to understand. The implication is that one would have to be extremely clever to understand 
Buddhist philosophy and perhaps even a mental contortionist able to believe two opposite things at 
once.   
It must be conceded that many people who read Nagarjuna, the Buddhist philosopher who most 
clearly describes the logical scheme of Buddhism and more generally ‘nondualism’, conclude that he 
did not fully understand the nature of Reality. Some even read him as proving that a full 
understanding would be impossible. It must also be conceded that this view may only arise when we 
are failing to understand him. Nobody can tell us who is right about this and we must make up our 
own mind. Priest’s view is that Nagarjuna ‘thought that certain things might be simultaneously true 
and false’.  This implies that nobody would be capable of understanding Buddhist philosophy, for it 
seems unlikely that anyone could perform this intellectual feat. In fact his philosophy is much simpler 
than it may appear. Indeed, its simplicity is what makes it so difficult to understand.   
Nagarjuna is completely intolerant of contradictions and demonstrates this in his Fundamental Verses 
on the Middle Way. In this text he proves that all extreme metaphysical positions are logically absurd. 
This is just as professors everywhere conclude. He does not prove that his own view is logically 
absurd. He clearly intends to prove that the mean is the only logically defensible view. In metaphysics 
the phrase ‘Middle Way’ indicates neutrality in respect of all extreme views and so it is an explicit 
denial of the reality of the divisions and distinctions on which metaphysical contradictions depend. 
There would be no such thing as a metaphysical dilemma. His proof is a classic demonstration of 
logic-chopping that follows Aristotle’s rules to the letter and entirely depends on them for its success. 
He shows that there is no such thing as a true contradiction and that no contradictions would arise for 
a true description of the Universe.   
That is to say, Nagarjuna painstakingly proves that there are no contradictions in Buddhist 
philosophy. And yet, highlighted at the top of Priest’s article is the statement ‘Buddhist philosophy is 
full of contradictions’. It is not clear who makes this statement and it may be an editorial addition but 
that it can be made so boldly suggests that it expresses a common view. So what is going on here? Is 
the Buddhist universe paradoxical or is it a model of logical soundness?  
Let us examine two oft-quoted statements that encapsulate Buddhist philosophy and follow their 
logical implications. The first is the statement of Heraclitus ‘We are and are-not’. For Buddhist 
philosophy this would not be exactly a true statement (as Nagarjuna proves), but it would be rigorous 
in that it would point accurately towards the truth and not mislead. Does it embody a contradiction?  
Aristotle’s law of non-contradiction (LNC) states that for any A it is impossible for both A and ~A to 
be true. That is to say, if the assertion ‘x is square’ is true, then the assertion ‘x is-not square’ cannot 
also be true. The law of the excluded middle (LEM) states that for any A it is necessary for one of A 
and ~A to be true. Either x is square or it is not and there is no third alternative. Where there is a third 
alternative then what we are calling A and ~A are not legitimate dialectical propositions. Given these 
rules, should we agree with the professors of Unreason that this statement of Heraclitus is an example 
of ‘illogic’? Must we reject it for embodying a contradiction and breaking Aristotle’s rules?  
The second statement is Lao Tsu’s famous aphorism, ‘True words seem paradoxical’. Is this statement 
true? If so, it should seem paradoxical. Nagarjuna proves that it is true. The whole of ‘nondualism’, 
‘Mysticism’ or the ‘Perennial’ philosophy proposes that it is true. This is the explanation for the use 
of a language of seeming paradox and contradiction in the Perennial philosophy. This language is 
required precisely in order to avoid the paradoxes and contradictions that we are led into by our 
everyday language and that may become conceptual errors where we allow ordinary language to 
restrict our reason, the very problem identified by the professors of Unreason.  
Would either of these statements imply a rejection of Aristotle’s LNC or LEM? Despite appearances 
they would not. Lao Tus tells us that true words seem paradoxical not that they actually are, and 
Aristotle was a rigorous thinker who would not have written a set of rules for rational thinking that 
did not cover all situations, even that described by Heraclitus and Lao Tsu.   
The idea that the view of Heraclitus, Lao Tsu and Nagarjuna requires that we abandon or modify the 
LNC or LEM depends on one crucial assumption, which is that for complementary and contradictory 
pairs of extreme metaphysical positions one member is true and the other false. How many of us do 
not make this assumption? We ask ‘Does the world begin with Something or Nothing?’ or ‘Do we 
have Freewill?’ and expect a straight answer, and when we do not get one the same assumption 
prevents us from understanding why not. When we make this assumption we must insist that 
Heraclitus make up his mind for now he cannot endorse compatibilism without appearing to break the 
rules. He must say either we exist or we do not. But Heraclitus knows that such words would not be 
true. By his juxtaposition of opposites he tells us that for his view it would not be metaphysically 
rigorous to state either that we exist or we do not. When we use language we are forced into stating 
two half-truths just as Nagarjuna proves and explains with his ‘Doctrine of Two Truths’, and this 
would be why a statement that is rigorously (thus metaphysically) true must be complex and is bound 
to seem paradoxical.         
The reason why such statements are not actually paradoxical would be that Aristotle carefully defines 
what he means by a contradiction. He saw that it was vital to closely define the pair of opposites 
‘A/not-A’ in order that his rules for the dialectic would not be misapplied and produce incorrect 
results. For any system of computation the rule is ‘garbage in, garbage out’. His Rule of Contradictory 
Pairs (RCP) is clear and simple.    
Of every contradictory pair, one member is true and the other false.   
Aristotle’s system is tautological in the sense that the LNC and the LEM would apply to pairs of 
statements only where we already know that they apply. If we do not know that they apply then we 
may be making a mistake by applying them and our reasoning will be unsafe. Members of a true 
dichotomy are jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive, but not all seemingly contradictory pairs 
will meet this criterion. If we know that a switch has only two positions and that no other position is 
possible then the statements ‘the switch is on’ and ‘the switch is off’ would form a contradictory pair 
such that one is true and other false. We can then use the dialectic method to decide which position it 
is most likely to be in given what else we know about it. For instance, if the room is dark we might 
use this fact to reduce to absurdity the idea that the switch is on. However, if we are not certain that no 
other position is possible then the LNC and LEM cannot decide this for us. We would have to go and 
look. Aristotle ensured that there was no possibility of the world breaking his laws by formulating 
them so that wherever they might be broken they would not apply. His definition for contradictory 
pairs protects his system from any tricks that Reality might pull on him. Perhaps more importantly, it 
requires us to closely examine our assumptions before building them into our questions and our 
reasoning and by so doing rendering both more a hindrance than a help. The system is sophisticated 
and reliable but only when used with rigour. This would be the danger of category-errors in 
philosophy, where they can run so deep that even one can undermine the integrity of the entire 
system.  
In the literature of the Perennial philosophy, which would include Nagarjuna’s writings, it is very 
difficult to find pairs of statements that would meet Aristotle’s definition. This would be the reason 
why its language seems paradoxical, for it is difficult to avoid such statements. There would be no 
true contradictions and this requires that we deny them in our statements about the world. Heraclitus 
shows us how to do it. He was not suggesting that the atomic statements ‘We exist’ and ‘We exist-
not’ form a contradictory pair but precisely the opposite, that they would not form a contradictory pair 
for there is another alternative. If his statement seems formally contradictory to us then this must be 
because we are assuming it would be true to say either ‘we exist’ or ‘we do not exist’. Lao Tsu tells us 
that this language is nonsense. It embodies assumptions that have nothing to do with logic but depend 
on a misunderstanding of Existence and Personhood. The professors of Unreason would mark us 
down for allowing language to limit what our reason will allow. Once comprehended, Heraclitus and 
Nagarjuna tell us, Existence and non-Existence are seen not to form a contradiction but two ways of 
describing a situation that defies description in language because of the very nature of language. It 
would not be that there is no truth of the matter, as if Buddhist philosophy is not informed by truth or 
grounded in it. Heraclitus’ statement could hardly be more simple and clear or more packed with 
meaning, while on metaphysics Nagarjuna says all that he needs to say. From a logical perspective the 
latter’s famous proof states no more than that all positive or extreme metaphysical positions are 
logically absurd, an analytical  result that it is difficult not to reach upon which even the professors of 
Unreason agree. We need not study Nagarjuna’s proof to verify that this is a perennial result of 
metaphysical analysis. The problem is only understanding his explanation of this result.     
It is well-known that Heraclitus, Nagarjuna, Lao Tsu and the Buddha never endorse a metaphysical 
view that would qualify as a member of a contradictory-pair. Nagarjuna is famous for his argument 
that we should never do this.  How can contradictions arise? Heraclitus implies by his juxtaposition of 
extreme views that on their own each half of his complex statement would be unrigorous, inadequate, 
more false than true, and a contradiction cannot arise for two falsities. His statement is certainly not 
easy to understand but on what grounds can we argue that it breaks the laws of logic? If there is a 
third alternative then there is no contradiction. The contradiction would be in the eye of the beholder 
for such words only seem paradoxical.         
By calling the mean ‘illogical’ the professors of Unreason fail to take into account Aristotle’s simple 
definition for contradictory pairs. The mean is not ‘illogical or even unreasonable when it is the only 
alternative to the absurdity of the extremes. It is only when we misapply Aristotle’s rules that the 
mean need seem paradoxical. Buddhism is the claim that there is no such thing as a true contradiction. 
The Universe would be a Unity such that all contradictions would be illusory conceptual things. 
Aristotle gave us a well-designed precision instrument and if we follow his instructions for using it we 
will find it difficult to discover violations of his LNC or LEM in Buddhism’s Middle Way 
philosophy.  
Buddhist philosophy uses Aristotle’s rules correctly, as Nagarjuna demonstrates by using it to refute 
all false views. By contrast, professors generally ignore Aristotle’s definition for contradictory pairs. 
Metaphysics then becomes an inconclusive muddle of flawed thinking. The only known solution for 
metaphysics will have been ruled out for being logically incoherent. If we are serious about the LNC 
then when our reason concludes that Something and Nothing, Mind and Matter, Freewill and 
Determinism or some other pair of extreme views are absurd then we have no option but to seek a 
resolution in some sort of compatabilism. Logic forces us all to follow Nagarjuna and Aristotle puts 
up no objection. This approach disposes of all metaphysical dilemmas and antinomies. However, if 
we believe that this approach would break the laws of ordinary logic then we will believe that 
Buddhist doctrine is ‘illogical’, unreasonable or at best incomprehensible and may reject it. Even if 
we withhold judgement on its truth we are likely to believe that we would be incapable of 
understanding it. Thus the view that Aristotle and Nagarjuna are at odds may be profoundly damaging 
to Buddhism and something of a PR disaster. It seems disrespectful to both and history shows that it 
renders metaphysics intractable.  
At this time the professors of the Colleges of Unreason are in full agreement with those in our 
universities. The mean is illogical and Buddhism must be considered logically tortuous and perhaps 
even incomprehensible. This is not a charitable interpretation of Nagarjuna and even if it were it 
would not be plausible. It makes his doctrine seem logically devious, as if he pulled some sort of trick 
on us by exploiting a loophole in the rules. In fact his entire logical argument depends on the 
Aristotelian idea that logical contradictions are a proof of falsity. Where a theory gives rise to 
contradictions he assumes we will all agree that it should be considered false and will reject it 
accordingly. If we do not then his proof of Buddhism is rendered useless.  
The Middle Way doctrine appears to be paradoxical only when we assume that the ‘mean’ represents 
a violation of reason and dialectical logic, an assumption that is not supported by Aristotle. There is a 
conceptual challenge here but no logical problem. Whether there is a third alternative for a pair of 
statements may sometimes be a matter of logic or definition, but where they are statements about the 
world it would be an empirical matter. Only where we know there is no third alternative would the 
LNC and LEM apply. If we ignore this proviso and use the system without rigour then Buddhist 
philosophy will seem to be full of contradictions and the whole of the Perennial philosophy along 
with it, while metaphysics will become incomprehensible.    
When we are asked whether two plus two equals three or five we do not consider this to be a case of 
A/not-A because we know that there is an alternative. If we do the same for metaphysical antinomies 
then no logical problems arise and for exactly the same reason.  This creates difficulties for our 
intellect but not for logic. We cannot assume two statements meet Aristotle’s definition for a 
contradictory pairs but must know that they do, otherwise in our reasoning we will ask improper 
questions and reach unreliable results. Nagarjuna’s logical demolition of all metaphysical positions 
except his own proves that there is a third alternative for all metaphysical extremes and it would 
follow that no modification of Aristotle’s rules would be required for his view. As Kant notes, and as 
we all discover, selective conclusions about the world as a whole are undecidable. Both extremes are 
absurd. The reason would be, as Nagarjuna proves, that there are no true contradictions. The extremes 
would be conceptual mistakes. Metaphysical dilemmas would be misunderstandings.    
In his Metaphysics the ninth-century Persian thinker Avicenna writes, “Anyone who denies the law of 
non-contradiction should be beaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not 
to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned.”   
Buddhist philosophy would not disagree on the importance of the LNC. Nagarjuna and Lao Tsu claim 
that the metaphysical truth is not this or that in any case. If we assume this and that are the only 
available options then their claim will seem to break the laws of ordinary reason and logic. Should 
they be burned? Clearly not, for they argue that in metaphysics there is no case for which this and that 
exhaust the possibilities. Many philosophers and theologians endorse Compatibilism in respect of the 
Freewill-Determinism dualism for they see the possibility that this contradictory and complementary 
pair might be transcended for a reconciliation. Are they being unreasonable? Aristotle would say not. 
Compatibilism endorses neither extreme view and denies that they form a contradictory pair for the 
dialectic.   
This statement on the LNC would seem muddled to Heraclitus because Avicenna forgets that is that it 
is not just the burning that matters but the identity of the victim. If ‘we are and are-not’ then it would 
never be rigorously true to say that we are being burned or not being burned. This is the subtlety of 
the Buddha’s teachings on suffering, that for an ultimate analysis there would be no such thing. 
Nagarjuna explains this. He shows that Avicenna is right to value the law of non-contradiction highly 
and he uses it to eliminate all extreme metaphysical positions. He denies the truth of either/or and 
both/neither for every pair of metaphysical opposites, showing that in no case and on neither axis 
would they meet Aristotle’s definition for a contradictory pair. The idea that he asks us to abandon the 
LNC or LEM is incredible. He asks us to enforce the rules with complete rigour and to make no 
exceptions. For metaphysical antinomies such as Mind-Matter or Something-Nothing there would be 
a third option and it would be that the words and concepts we are using inevitably misrepresent the 
true situation in just the way the professors of Unreason fear. If we hang on to these linguistic and 
conceptual distinctions then metaphysics cannot be solved. No fundamental theory would be possible. 
As Kant concludes, all concepts would have to be reduced for a complete theory. Both Matter and 
Mind must be reduced.  
There are too many issues here to summarise. Although the discussion is an attempt to simplify it may 
yet give the impression that Buddhist philosophy is hopelessly complicated.  Yet the logical issue we 
are discussing is basic, a high-school level philosophical issue. For a contradictory pair of statements 
one of them must be true and the other false. If this holds for a pair of statements then we can use the 
dialectic method of refutation to decide which is true and which false. Where it does not hold then the 
dialectic is an inappropriate method for deciding and it will lead us to unreliable conclusions.  
The difficulty of understanding Buddhist philosophy and the world it describes is intense precisely 
because there would be no true contradictions. This idea challenges our intellect, which depends on 
contradictions for its functioning. What Nagarjuna proves and Kant later concludes is that the only 
reasonable world-theory would be one for which our conceptual world-of-opposites is reduced to 
Unity, a phenomenon Nicolas de Cusa famously places ‘beyond the coincidence of contradictories’.  
In this case it is not plausible that there are contradictions in Buddhist philosophy. If they seem to be 
all over the place it would be because true words seem paradoxical. They may seem less so if we take 
note of Aristotle’s rule for contradictory pairs and allow ourselves to abandon the absurd extremes for 
an exploration of the mean.     
__ 
This discussion is heavily reliant on two texts and they are recommended to anyone wishing to pursue 
these matters.  
Whitaker C. W. A., Aristotle’s De Interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic, Oxford (1996) 
 Gyamtso, Khenpo Tsütrim, The Sun of Wisdom: Teachings on the Noble Nagarjuna’s Fundamental 
Wisdom of the Middle Way, Shambala (2003) 
